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0. INTRODUCTION 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are hot in the public sector, and hence a popular topic 
for public sector scholars to study (Hodge and Greve 2005; Pollitt 2005; Skelcher 2005). 
Nonetheless, little systematic knowledge is available about the design, the control and 
particularly the performance of PPPs. Some of the main issues in PPP-research therefore 
include the democratic quality of PPPs (Skelcher, De Rynck, Klijn and Voets 2008), their 
policy impact (McLaughlin and Osborne 2000), and management issues (Klijn and Teisman 
2000). 
The study of PPPs is also complex, as they include a range of forms (Skelcher 2005) and are 
highly contingent (Pollitt 2003). The type and number of cases studied and reported in the 
literature is therefore varied, as is the number of theoretical perspectives – if any - used. 
It is clear that the main binding element in PPP-research is the object of study, rather than 
a joint conceptual or theoretical perspective (see for instance the work of Considine, 
Greve, Hodge, Klijn, Koppenjan, Osborne, Skelcher and Teisman).  
Like in other OECD-countries, PPP is also a popular theme in the public sector in Belgium 
(Voets, Verhoest, Troupin and Van Gestel forthcoming). In this context, the Flemish 
government currently sponsors a five-year research project (2007-2011) to study PPP-
practices at the Flemish and local level. The research project focuses in particular on the 
way public partners try to control specific PPPs, and how this affects the performance of 
those PPPs. The fundamental question of the research project is the following: which 
factors - in terms of institutional design, control and government capacity – influence/have 
an impact upon the performance of PPPs? Linked to the former, we also explore which 
theoretical perspectives provide the best insights and explanatory power. Main 
perspectives tested include interorganisational cooperation, trust, control mechanisms 
(networks, control and markets) and neo-institutional economics. 
This paper is based on that research project. It deals with two questions in particular. 
Firstly, how do public partners control different stages of a PPP? Secondly, how is control 
affected by elements of complexity? As such, the independent variable is complexity, 
while the dependent variable is control.  
The paper also brings in empirical evidence, namely two case studies concerning the 
DBFMO2 of local sports infrastructure (swimming pools). These case studies are the first in 
a series of cases studied in the long range research project. The case studies show the 
usefulness of the concepts of complexity and control, but also suggest some amendments.  
The first section of the paper briefly introduces the conceptual framework developed to 
study the abovementioned questions. We will only elaborate on the parts relevant in this 
paper, being control and complexity. The second section of the paper discusses two case 
studies. Both cases involve local sports infrastructure projects, set up by local governments 
and private partners. The paper concludes with lessons learned, and critical reflections on 
the use of these concepts in future PPP-research.  
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 Design, Build, Finance, Maintain, Operate.  
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1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper draws on a more elaborate conceptual framework, used in the long-term 
research project (Van Gestel, Voets and Verhoest forthcoming, see Figure 1). As the figure 
shows, key components are the type of PPP, complexity, government capacity, the control 
mix, and performance. Only the two boxes marked in grey are dealt with in this paper. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
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We assume that the interaction between control mechanisms, instruments and actions on 
the one hand (making up the control mix), and between them and the PPP-performance on 
the other, is influenced by different aspects. Three main antecedent and independent 
variables are expected to affect the latter: the type of PPP (we distinguish ‘contractual’3 
and ‘participative’4 PPP), the complexity of the PPP (defined by a set of features, 
including the perceived risks), and government capacity to manage PPPs.  
In doing so, the conceptual framework draws on different theoretical perspectives: 
interorganisational cooperation, trust and network theories, Weberian control theories and 
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 This form heavily relies upon contractual agreements between the partners. Goals 
are set by the public parties implicated by the project. This model implies clearly 
definable outputs, easy to monitor by the government. There is limited room for the 
private partner to negotiate, because the goals are already clearly stated by the 
public party. During the execution stage, renegotiations, recommitments are limited. 
4
 In this type, a special purpose vehicle is formed to manage the project, 
incorporating all partners. This method leaves room for developing a “real” 
partnership - hence labelled ‘participative’. The outputs are not defined in a very 
detailed way (e.g. because it involves an innovative building technique, not yet 
completely developed). During the PPP-stages, there will be constant (re)negotiation 
and (re)commitment by the partners. In this type, public parties have less ex ante 
control on the output. This form relies on a real commitment of public parties to 
engage in a relationship-building process with private partners. 
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neo-institutional economics, which emphasise market control mechanisms. The framework 
draws on a range of insights in literature on control theories and on PPP, trying to combine 
and test them in a novel way. The control component however draws heavily on the work 
of Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest (forthcoming). 
 
1.1. Complexity 
Complexity is a key variable in the study of PPPs (Hodge and Greve 2008). Complexity is 
however a multi-dimensional concept. We unfold complexity in terms of multi-actor 
complexity, technical complexity, and political complexity. Complexity also entails the 
element of risk, and risk is therefore an essential element of PPPs (Klijn and Teisman 
2005). Three types or groups of risks exist (Das and Teng 2001; Ducatteeuw 2005; 
Koppenjan and Van Ham 2002): operational or performance risks, relational risks, and 
democratic risks. Each dimension of complexity is related to one of these groups of risks. 
We assume that each of these elements affects the control mix used/found in the PPPs.   
 
1.1.1. Multi-actor complexity  
The multi-actor dimension encompasses actor-related elements commonly used in network 
literature (see Voets 2008 for an overview). The number of actors involved in the PPP is 
relevant: the higher the number of actors (all other things being equal), the more complex 
the PPP becomes. Actor-related complexity however also depends on their nature (public, 
private, from different governmental tiers), their resources and interdependencies 
(objective and subjective), and the extent to which the scope of the PPP is relatively 
straightforward or multi-functional (e.g. merely a swimming pool vs. a multifunctional 
sports complex combined with conference facilities).  
The relational risks5 are linked to the multi-actor complexity, as strategic behaviour is 
typical in a multi-actor setting; like in any interorganisational or interpersonal 
relationship, there is always the risk of a partner not cooperating in good faith (Das and 
Teng 2001). 
 
1.1.2. Technical complexity  
Technical complexity refers to the extent to which selection- and allocation criteria can be 
defined clearly, results can be defined on beforehand, the project is pioneering/unique or 
building on standardised approaches and private partners have to invest without having a 
use of it in other PPPs (also relevant in terms of transaction costs), and whether there are 
many players around in the market or not. Finally, it also refers to the extent to which the 
PPP is Design, Built, Finance, Maintain and/or Operate.  
The risks associated with the technical complexity are operational or performance risks. 
Paraphrasing Das and Teng (2001:253), performance risks embrace all kinds of hazards, 
except those related to co-operation (which refers to relational risks), that can lead to the 
failure or unsatisfactory performance of the PPP, despite satisfactory cooperation among 
partners (Das and Teng 1996). So even when relations between partners are excellent, and 
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 Relational risks are expected to be more important in participative PPP, which 
feature less contractual safeguards. 
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there are little democratic risks perceived, the performance of the PPP can be inadequate 
because of other reasons (e.g. the global financial crisis, hampering access to required 
funds and loans). The performance risks involve the operational risks of the project, 
planning risks (delay of permits by governments), design risks (designing mistakes, possible 
necessary changes in design), construction risks (construction delays and mistakes), 
maintaining risks (unexpected costs during exploitation period, force majeure risks, and 
tort liability), and financial risks (insecurities during calculation of estimates and 
inflation). When the outputs can be clearly defined, public partners often try to turn these 
risks over to the private partners (i.e. risk-sharing).  
 
1.1.3. Political complexity  
Essentially, this dimension of complexity refers to the degree to which the PPP is salient or 
not in political terms. We expect this to be an important element that affects control , as 
a high political complexity (e.g. competition of political parties, supportive or protesting 
societal stakeholders) is expected to lead to a different control strategy by governments 
than a PPP with low political salience. Political complexity is developed here in societal 
salience (support or opposition of societal stakeholders, salience between (in this paper 
local) governments, and salience between (in this case local) political parties. The last 
element is brought in because of the typical Belgian political system, which is dominated 
by party politics and features coalition government. 
The democratic risks are linked to political complexity, as the degree thereof will trigger 
strict or looser control efforts by public partners. Depending on the societal, 
intergovernmental and party political salience, democratic risks vary from low to high. We 
assume that the higher the perceived democratic risks, the stronger the control of public 
partners will be. They will for instance try to closely monitor the project or might go to 
court whenever they feel their voice is not represented in the implementation of the 
project. 
We assume that the level and type of complexities and perception of these risks influences 
the control mix used and hence the performance achieved by PPPs. Partners will be less 
inclined to make far-reaching commitments when complexities and risks are perceived 
(too) great, whereas these commitments contribute greatly to the added value of PPPs. 
Depending on the level of the perceived complexity and risk, public actors are expected to 
try to control the PPP more strictly or more at a distance. Depending on the type of 
complexity and risk, the type of control is also expected to differ, e.g. the contract 
containing more hierarchic, market or network-oriented elements – as one of the ways to 
reduce complexity and the perception of risks (and thus the uncertainty of partners) in 
PPPs is to stipulate controlling and monitoring mechanisms in the contract. We will now 
elaborate on the concept of control.   
 
1.2. Control 
The crux of the conceptual framework is the black box of control. Control is used here in 
its broadest sense, namely the cycle of guidance, control (in its strict sense) and 
evaluation (Kaufmann et al. 1986), encompassing the mechanisms and instruments used by 
government to intentionally influence the decisions and the behaviour of other 
governments or private partners in order to achieve government objectives (Verhoest, 
Peters, Beuselinck, Meyers and Bouckaert 2005).  
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In the context of PPPs, also paraphrasing White (1991:189), control can be defined here as 
the general mechanisms and more specific sets of instruments that public actors use to 
consciously influence the behaviour of other public and private actors in the PPP to 
achieve the public actors’ goals. 
The black box of control can be fit into the well-known trinity of hierarchy, market and 
networks (HMN). The distinction between hierarchies, markets and networks as three 
fundamental mechanisms of control in social life is widely accepted in the literature 
(Thompson et al. 1991; O’Toole 1997; Kaufmann et al. 1986). A PPP can be considered a 
social system in which interdependent actors develop certain interaction and 
communication patterns, with a certain level of endurance, to deal with a policy problem 
or programme (Hufen and Ringeling 1990; Kickert and Van Vugt 1984). Table 1 presents 
their basic features.  
Table 1: Basic features of hierarchy, market, and network 
 
(Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest forthcoming:29) 
In such a system, three ways of social interaction are possible. Firstly, individuals or 
organisations interact on the basis of authority and dominance. This is the case if actors 
have unequal positions and if rules and instructions or commands determine the behaviour 
of the dependent party. The central pattern of interaction is authority, operationalized in 
administrative orders, rules and planning on the one hand and dominance and authority as 
the basic control system on the other hand.  
Secondly, individuals or organisations interact on the basis of exchange. This is the case if 
partners have equal and independent positions and if price and rewards determine the 
mutual behaviour. Market control is based on competition, bargaining and exchange 
between actors. The price mechanism, incentives and the self-interest of actors 
coordinate the activities of the different actors by creating an ‘invisible hand’.  
Finally, individuals or organisations interact on the basis of shared values, solidarity, and 
conviction. This is the case if partners have equal but mutual dependent positions. 
Network control takes the form of cooperation between actors whose inter-organizational 
relations are ruled by the acknowledgement of mutual interdependencies, trust and the 
responsibilities of each actor.  
 7
This typology matches the classification by Alexander (1995: 36-40) in which he ranks 
coordination strategies by the level of voluntarism/coerciveness. He distinguishes between 
control strategies, based on authority, structural changes (hierarchy) or competition 
(market) on the one hand, and cooperative strategies, based on mutual exchange of 
resources, cooptation and information (network). 
In our opinion these three mechanisms provide a useful typology to analyse control efforts 
within the public sector; they prove to be a powerful analytical tool that should be used to 
further the study of PPP. This trinity is used in very distinct ways, in inter- and intra-
organisational research: to study different government levels (Hegner 1986), to label 
different state models (Van Heffen and Klok 2000), to name different ways to operate local 
government (Bouckaert et al. 2002), to analyse interorganisational clusters (e.g. Osborne 
(2000) about bringing in third sector parties to provide personal social services or Lowndes 
and Skelcher (2002) to analyse partnerships), as a way to control staff departments in 
organisations (Vosselman 1995), or to assess control within organisations in general (Ouchi 
1980), also defining a bureaucratic, market and social mechanism to control.  
These three general mechanisms can be made more concrete in the form of control 
instrument typologies. In cybernetics, the control system contains three subsystems: an ex 
ante subsystem of planning and target setting; an ex nunc and ex post measurement and 
monitoring subystem and an ex post subsystem of evaluation, audit and feedback. We use 
a control instrument typology based on existing typologies (see for instance Van der 
Doelen, Lindblom, Dunsire, Etzioni) and developed further by Verhoest (2005) and 
Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest (forthcoming).  
 
1.2.1. Hierarchic control instruments 
Hierarchic control is closely related to the bureaucratic mechanism, referring to the 
principle of the Weberian bureaucracy based on (arbitrary) rules about available inputs, 
required processes and/or standards of results and quality. The actor that controls sets the 
rules and standards, monitors and evaluates the compliance with those rules and standards 
by the implementing actor. Typically, the bureaucratic or hierarchic mechanism is used in 
vertical relations between dominant actors and their subordinates (Verhoest 2005).  
There are a number of typical features of a hierarchy. First of all, control is top-down. 
Actors that are being controlled are considered relatively passive objects (hence also 
referred to as the single actor model). Secondly, authority is the interaction pattern. 
There is a clear distinction between politics and administration. Politics control and decide 
on the strategic goals, and are the basis of the control relationship. Hierarchic control 
typically works through routine and an authoritative control structure. This enables the 
development of bureaucratic routines. Rules and commands are the basis for planning in a 
normative power relation; supervision is the basis for management control. In terms of 
sanctioning (positive and negative), rewards and punishment are being used. Finally, 
conflicts are resolved through authority, exercised by the controlling government. 
These features can be translated into a typology of hierarchic control instruments. Control, 
focused typically on input and process, then is achieved by: 
¾ Restrictive rules 
¾ Veto power 
¾ Power of annulment or the competence of a higher public body to annul decisions 
made by lower public bodies  
¾ Ex ante rules and directions/regulations 
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¾ Detailed procedures (e.g. detailed step-by-step plans) 
¾ Ex ante authorisation and approval 
¾ Supervision or punctual inspections of primary processes (i.e. primary supervision) 
¾ recognition procedures 
¾ Direct instructions 
¾ Line item-budgeting, involving very detailed picture of expenditure (decreasing 
autonomy to allocate money differently) 
 
1.2.2. Market oriented control instruments 
The general assumption with the market mechanism is that actors base their behaviour on 
the price on a competitive market. The main difference between the market mechanism 
and bureaucratic mechanism is that there are no ex ante rules set by higher levels that 
direct implementation processes through which implementation can be monitored. The 
norms are set by the market in the form of a market price (Vosselman 1996). 
The market mechanism is therefore based on a horizontal interaction relation, between 
equal actors (Verhoest 2002). The control instruments used here are often formulated in 
terms of a principal-agent relationship. To reduce the opportunistic behaviour of the 
agent, the principal-agent theory points to three strategies (Verhoest 2003). A first 
strategy is monitoring, which means that the principal can observe, monitor, and evaluate 
the behaviour and/or results of the agent. Monitoring thus reduces the information-
asymmetry between principal and agent. Secondly, bonding implies that the principal can 
incorporate ex ante safeguards to prevent the agent of taking actions which prejudice the 
interests of the principal. The agent can also set up an internal control system of its own. 
A third strategy involves rewards and transfer of (typically operational) risks. The principal 
builds in sanctions and rewards to stimulate the agent. Transfer of risks also lowers 
incongruence of goals. 
These features can be translated into a typology of market control instruments. Control, 
typically focused on output and transaction, then is achieved by: 
¾ Contractual agreements 
¾ Performance norms and monitoring 
¾ Result-oriented reporting 
¾ Transfer of risks 
¾ Performance control and audit provisions (auditing internal control) 
¾ Mediation and conciliation service (strong market orientation: very strict mediation, 
usually one round, followed by court)  
¾ Contractual monitoring moments (e.g. revision of contracts each 5 years) 
¾ secondary supervision (audit internal control mechanisms) 
¾ Degree of competition 
o Before the negotiation 
o During the contract (e.g. evaluating the contract each 5 years, continuous 
pressure) 
¾ Market-oriented financing 
o Result-oriented financing (result-bound financial incentives) (e.g. finances 
dependent on visitor numbers) 
o Both result-oriented rewarding and punishing 
o Benefit sharing 
o Benchmarking (financing dependent on results in comparison to similar 
projects in the market) 
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1.2.3. Network control instruments 
While networks have some features of the hierarchic and market mechanism, there are 
sufficient arguments to consider it a distinct mechanism (Verhoest 2002).  
A first feature is that interactions are based on reciprocity. Trust, collaboration and loyalty 
are key concepts in networks. Secondly, the network mechanism is based on the idea that 
actors are able to identify complementary interests. This leads to resource exchanges 
between actors, based on interdependent relations, trust, loyalty and reciprocity (Kickert, 
Klijn and Koppenjan 1997). Next, government as an actor in networks is an equal of other 
actors. Government does not hold a hierarchic position vis-à-vis other actors (although 
government is of course a special actor because it has a monopoly of a number of 
resources, like using force). Policy then is being developed in a network, rather than 
merely being implemented.  
Typically, policy is the outcome of the interaction process between independent partners, 
meaning that the distinction between policy development and implementation becomes 
vague. Fifthly, the network mechanism involves a specific set of management strategies 
(Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997), in which success is not necessarily measured in terms 
of goal achievement but (also) in terms of satisfaction of participants about the process 
itself and whether joint solutions for problems can be forwarded. In network control, fine 
tuning and flexibility takes priority over generic instruments like legislation and one-size-
fits-all solutions. Networks are also featured by coalitions. To avoid the negative impact of 
fragmentation and proliferation, networks are set up by stakeholders, customers or based 
on policy cycles. Finally, conflicts are solved using the reputation of network members. 
These features can be translated into a typology of network control instruments. Control, 
typically focused on process and trust, then is achieved by: 
¾ Network management (including culture and relations) 
¾ Mutual control 
o Frequent (personal) contacts, extensive consultation and collaborative 
procedures 
o Control through people, based on social control, reputation, legitimacy, … 
o Advising, co-decision making 
¾ Horizontal control, involving stakeholders and peers in the process, like: 
o User panels 
o Users in boards  
o Visitations (e.g. to benchmark each others control systems) 
 
The three-fold typology of control instruments can be used to map to what extent they are 
present or not in a case. However, the formal presence of such instruments is only part of 
the control story. We are interested in understanding the mix of these three types of 
control, in terms of their mutual interaction, variables that affect the mix, and the overall 
impact of the mix on performance of PPPs. We refer to a control mix since the three types 
are ideal-types that never occur in their pure form (Parsons 1995). 
We also analyse the control mix from a dynamic perspective, in order to understand how 
the mix changes, for what reason, and with what effects. To be able to do so, we need to 
introduce a set of PPP-stages. 
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1.3. PPP-stages 
As PPPs are dynamic processes, interaction between the abovementioned variables is 
analysed in a dynamic way. To do so, we distinguish between different stages of a PPP. 
Most publications distinguish stages in terms of the substance or project management of 
the PPP. Koppenjan and Van Ham (2002) for instance defines the phase of exploration 
(initiation), planning (definition & design), realization (build) and operation (operate & 
maintain).  
If one takes an actor-oriented perspective, the distinction becomes somewhat different. 
Based on the model of the centre of expertise on PPP of the Flemish government (‘Vlaams 
Kenniscentrum PPS’), the four stages we use here are (see figure 2): the initiation stage 
(similar to the exploration phase), the public structuration stage (similar to the planning 
phase), the selection stage (a separate stage in which the private partners need to be 
selected) and the implementation stage (bundling the realization and operation stage).   
In this paper, we focus on PPPs involving infrastructure development (as they are the most 
common type, see Eggers and Startup 2005). This means that the execution or 
implementation phase can be divided into two different sub stages. The first sub stage 
refers to the building of the infrastructure itself (i.e. the realization stage), the second sub 
phase is maintaining and/or managing the infrastructure (i.e. the operation stage). For 
example, the execution of the PPPs reported in this paper implies both the construction of 
the swimming pool and the management of the facility.  
 
Figure 2: PPP-stages 
Initiation Public-PublicStructuring Selection Execution
 
 (www.vlaanderen.be/pps) 
 
1.3.1. First phase: Initiation 
Regardless of the purpose, forming a PPP needs considerable investments by all parties. 
The main incentive for governments is the pre-financing and possible cost-saving of 
infrastructure projects. This is also one of the main critiques of the recent PPP-revival, 
namely that it has only provided the government with a mega-creditcard (Hodge and Greve 
2007).  
The initiation stage is therefore mainly concerned with an exploration of the possibilities 
to set up a PPP or not to achieve public goals. If multiple governmental actors are 
involved, this already involves interaction between public actors to analyse goal 
compatibility, potential for resource sharing, etc.  In this stage however, all aspects do not 
need to be developed in full detail.  
The conclusion of this stage is the decision of the public party or parties whether or not to 
act as a ‘triggering’ entity (Doz et al. 2000) for the formation of a PPP. Because of legal 
constraints, the initiative for PPPs remains almost always in the hands of public actors 
(Flamey and Knaepen 2005). 
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1.3.2. Second phase: Public-public structuring  
The next stage is a stage of project structuring between all involved public parties. All 
implicated public parties, local governments, specialized agencies are included in 
discussions about the project. The end point of this stage is a shared view on need and 
aims of the project, detailed in a plan of action, a project dossier. This detailed plan will 
later on serve as the basis for private partner selection. It is important to stress that this 
approved project dossier is comparable to the result of the commitment phase as defined 
in the model above, but is much more elaborate. 
The triggering government should also consider inviting stakeholders (like end-users, 
inhabitants) to the negotiation table to diminish the democratic risks. In this stage, the 
triggering public party will perform a preliminary testing of the added value of the project. 
If the outcome of this testing proves the PPP to be beneficial compared to the public 
execution of the same project, the next stage is initiated. In theory, all these elements are 
considered in this stage, because a suboptimal public-public structuring phase has 
implications on the stages later on in the process.  
Private entities are not included at this stage. This means that in the stages later on in the 
process, a new round of negotiations and commitment will be undertaken, in order to 
capture the genuine cooperation of the private partner. 
 
1.3.3. Third phase: Selection 
Private parties are now involved for the first time. The ‘triggering’ public actor should 
make the procurement procedure public, stating the selection procedure publicly, open to 
every private party that wants to participate in the partnership. Private sector incentives 
to participate are the profits and the opportunity to enter new markets, former 
government monopolies. Selection criteria must be made up in advance. This reduces the 
‘open process’ approach that is possible between public actors in the previous stages. 
Depending on the applied procedure, there is more room for real negotiations and 
commitments (see the case studies reported in this paper, showing how two different 
procedures were used, resulting in different relations with the private actors).  
 
1.3.4. Fourth phase: Execution 
This stage involves the implementation of the commitments taken in the preceding phases. 
In theory, there is no room for renegotiations, recommitments and a broadening of the 
commitments made in the public-private relationship, as they should be put into a new 
tendering process. Additionally, there is only limited room to exit the arrangement. It 
seems that an underlying thought is that, when the right private partner is selected, the 
project will be completed in accordance with the general outlined principles. UK research 
on PPPs shows that this is not necessary the case (Partnerships UK 2006) and renegotiations 
are rather frequent.  
For the purpose of this paper, the four stages are used for case description, but clustered 
for case analysis. Because the first two stages involve public actors only, we analyse the 
public-public relations together in one public-public stage. In the third and fourth stage, 
the focus shifts to the public-private interactions, hence joined into the public-private 
stage.  
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2. THE CASE STUDIES 
The research project – and hence this paper - builds on a multiple case study design. To 
understand how control takes shape in a PPP, and to flesh out the relevant elements of 
complexity that come into play, a comparative design is used. The cases selected are 
similar in a number of aspects, but differ on other aspects.  
Sets of cases are selected, with varying degrees of complexity, at different governmental 
tiers, at different stages of the PPP, with varying performance, and of a different type. 
This allows for cross-case comparisons, based on key variables of the conceptual 
framework.  
The case studies reported in this paper make up the first set. They are both contractual 
PPPs, they both involve the same scope (pool infrastructure, are both DFBMO, involve 
similar actors (two local governments and private consortium-, … As the analysis shows 
however, there are also relevant differences between both.  
Data was drawn from official documents (contracts, calls, …), grey material (personal 
notes, e-mails, …), and semi-structured interviews (10 interviews per case) with PPP-
partners (public and private) and observers. 
Dommelslag 
The pool infrastructure ‘Dommelslag’ is the outcome of a PPP involving two neighbouring 
local governments (Overpelt and Neerpelt) and a consortium of private partners.  
Both local governments share some features: they are similar in size, population, budget, 
and governing coalition. They are also considered complementary in terms of their spatial 
structure and a number of functions (e.g. Overpelt being a more industrial municipality 
and Neerpelt having a flourishing centre for retail trade), but they both had their own 
swimming pool.  
In the mid 1990s, both local governments were confronted with old-fashioned and run-
down pools on their territory. Both pools needed to be renovated and adapted to new 
health and safety norms. In both cases, studies for renovation showed a very high pricetag. 
The Overpelt pool was owned and managed by the local government, the Neerpelt pool 
was owned and managed by a private school through a non-profit organisation in which 
local government was represented and which received an annual subsidy for the pool. 
In 1997, both local governments decided to set up an intercommunal pool infrastructure 
involving private partners. The motivation to replace their separate pools with a joint PPP 
was functional and financial; they wanted to provide a better (e.g. more basins & 
attractions like slides) and more cost-efficient pool. The project was named ‘Dommelslag’ 
and opened in 2003 as the first pool infrastructure in Flanders designed, built, financed, 
maintained and operated using a PPP. It is considered a success by all stakeholders 
involved: local governments, pool users (citizens, schools, swimming clubs) and private 
partners operating it.   
Elshout 
The context of Elshout is similar. The pool infrastructure ‘Elshout’ is the outcome of a PPP 
involving two neighbouring local governments (Brasschaat and Schoten) and a consortium 
of private partners.   
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Both local governments share some features: they are similar in size, population, budget, 
and governing coalition (but not identical). They are not considered complementary in 
terms of their spatial structure and a number of functions, and both had their own 
swimming pools.  
In 1997, Schoten was confronted with an out-dated swimming pool that could not meet 
new health & safety standards, unless it would finance a very expensive renovation. The 
swimming pool was also located in a district, mainly served the local schools and clubs, 
and could not expand in that area. A study ordered by Schoten explored two options, 
namely to built a new pool or to renovate the old pool. As both options proved as costly, 
the first option was chosen by the municipal council.   
Brasschaat owned and operated a swimming pool with indoor and outdoor basins, providing 
a regional function as it attracted people of the whole region. In 1999, they also ordered a 
study to see if their pool infrastructure could be modernised. The outcome of the study 
was similar: renovation would be very costly, and in combination with a number of 
exploitation problems with the existing infrastructure, local government officials decided 
to explore a different option. That option became concrete in contacts with Schoten, that 
faced a similar challenge; they decided in December 2001 to develop a joint pool 
infrastructure through PPP. The result, ‘Elshout’, opened to the public in January 2006. 
 
2.1. Public-public stage  
For the purpose of the case analyses, the four phases of a PPP defined in section 1.3. are 
clustered in two main stages. The ‘public-public’ stage joins the initiation stage and the 
public-public structuring phase, because there are only intergovernmental interactions 
between the local governments involved. We will now elaborate on the analysis of both 
cases in terms of complexity and control in this stage.   
 
2.1.1. Complexity 
In this section we will explore how the elements of complexity influence the institutional 
design and the use of specific control instruments and general control mechanisms. Table 2 
lists the different aspects of the multi-dimensional complexity-concept for both 
Dommelslag and Elshout in the public-public stage. This table is too extensive to discuss 
every aspect in detail, so we limit ourselves to the most relevant differences between both 
cases in terms of multi-actor complexity, technical complexity and political complexity. 
Main differences between cases are put in italics in the table.  
First of all, table 2 illustrates that the multi-actor complexity is quite similar in both cases. 
Important differences between the cases are the robustness of the governing coalition 
(stronger in Dommelslag) and the uniformity of the stakeholders (difference in culture 
between the swimming clubs of Schoten and Brasschaat). Also, unlike Dommelslag, in 
Elshout Brasschaat was the sole owner of the grounds where the swimming pool would be 
built. This gave Brasschaat a dominant position in the network. Nevertheless, both cases 
have a workable multi-actor setting.  
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Table 2: Complexity in the public-public stage 
 Dommelslag Elshout 
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Two neighboring municipalities (Overpelt and Neerpelt) 
¾ similar in size, population, budget and administrative culture 
¾ Led by the same Christian democratic party completed with a socialist 
coalition-party (vast majority) 
 
 
Stakeholders 
¾ schools, swimming clubs, diving club, inhabitants of the municipalities 
Two neighboring municipalities (Brasschaat and Schoten) 
¾ similar in size, population, budget and administrative culture 
¾ Led by the same Christian democratic party completed with different coalition-party (small 
majority) 
¾ Brasschaat was owner of suitable grounds and wanted the swimming pool to be built on it 
 
Stakeholders 
¾ schools, swimming clubs (Brasschaat: swimming schools; Schoten: competition clubs), diving 
club, inhabitants of the municipalities 
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A pool-infrastructure capable of providing bathing-facilities for schools and sport-
clubs at a fair price on the one hand and recreational elements to attract 
recreational swimmers on the other hand (population of 30 000 inhabitants). 
 
The municipalities were convinced that the private partner would finance the 
optional recreational elements because these elements would generate income 
for the private partner. For the elements municipalities thought indispensable for 
providing the public task, they counted on a cost of € 3,75 million. 
 
problem of structuring two municipalities  
¾ in order to go in dialogue with the private candidates 
¾ in order to acquiring the grounds (ownership structure) 
 
Specifications of the swimming pool 
Technical expertise present in the market 
Possibility of an advantageous VAT-regime 
First project in its kind in Flanders 
 
Operational risks 
¾ lack of private interest 
¾  Adverse selection 
A pool-infrastructure capable of providing bathing-facilities for schools and sport-clubs at a fair 
price on the one hand and recreational elements to attract recreational swimmers on the other 
hand (population of 70 000 inhabitants). 
 
Previous to the idea of cooperation, both municipalities had made a study concerning respectively 
the construction of a new swimming pool (Schoten) and the modernisation of the old swimming 
pool (Brasschaat). Constructing a new swimming pool for Schoten would cost more than € 5 
million, modernisation of the swimming pool of Brasschaat would have a price tag of € 3,5 million. 
 
problem of structuring two municipalities  
¾ in order to go in dialogue with the private candidates 
¾ ownership structure 
¾ consultation 
Specifications of the swimming pool 
Technical expertise present in the market 
Possibility of an advantageous VAT-regime 
 
 
Operational risks 
¾ lack of private interest 
¾ Adverse selection 
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Societal salience 
¾ presence of a sense of urgency 
 
 
Salience between local governments 
¾ location of the future swimming pool 
 
 
Salience between political parties 
¾ overall consensus 
¾ ‘soft’ opposition parties 
Societal salience 
¾ presence of a sense of urgency 
¾ strong opposition against the implementation in Brasschaat (Schoten: petitions, protests) 
 
Salience between local governments 
¾ location of the future swimming pool 
¾ specifications of the swimming pool 
 
Salience between political parties 
¾ disagreement in the governing coalition (ad hoc majority in Schoten) 
 implementation in Brasschaat 
 collaboration with private partners 
¾ Strong and aggressive opposition parties 
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Secondly, in terms of technical complexity, both cases are also alike. However, a relevant 
difference is the possibility to get an advantageous VAT-regime. Unlike Elshout, this aspect 
was of secondary importance in Dommelslag.  
Finally, one of the key differences is found in terms of political complexity. This 
complexity was considerably higher in the case of Elshout than it was in the case of 
Dommelslag. 
The next section will elaborate on control in both cases, and will show how these elements 
of complexity affect the control mix in the public-public stage. 
  
2.1.2. Control  
The typology of specific control instruments, presented earlier in this paper, was used to 
make the analyses of the two cases possible. To avoid a too detailed report of the cases, 
we will not report or distinguish each single control instrument used. Instead, we present a 
more general picture of the control-mix used in both cases. In what follows, we present 
the elements of complexity and accompanying risks in relation with the use of certain 
control mechanisms.   
 
Dommelslag 
In the public-public stage of Dommelslag, we mainly find network-like instruments, the 
network mechanism of control.  
The first contacts between the municipalities for instance developed in a particular 
informal manner. Already previous to the project Dommelslag, many informal contacts 
took place between the different key actors within both municipalities. In other words, 
there already existed a network-like relation between the key actors of both 
municipalities. The political actors within that network had a common history of 
interaction, reducing the relational risks significantly. As a result, the initiation of the 
project developed in a rather informal and closed manner. The decisions were taken by 
the political heavyweights (mayor and involved aldermen), the ratification by the 
municipal councils was ex post and only a formality. A first step to formalisation was the 
establishment of an inter-local workgroup, which also operated in a network-like manner.  
The cooperation between the two municipalities was formalized further with the 
establishment of the intermunicipal Service Association Pelt (which among others required 
formal authorization of the municipality councils, so elements of the hierarchic 
mechanism). But even in this more formalized setting, the working method did not chance 
much. The municipal councils approved the decisions made by the key actors ex post to 
the actual decision.  
The most important task in this stage was the drawing up of the specifications. The 
stakeholders, as users of the future swimming pool, participated in the process of drawing 
up the output specifications. 
The problem of intermunicipal cooperation and common purchase of the necessary grounds 
was solved with the establishment of a service association as a separate legal person, that 
would become the vehicle to structure the actual PPP. 
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Because of the low political complexity, the development of the project was kept within 
the governing coalitions. To save time, the complete project was taken in hands by a 
political heavyweight in both municipalities, assisted by administrative expertise. The 
governing majority could permit such an elitist and closed way of working, because they 
relied on a vast majority in the municipal council, and did not expect much resistance 
from the opposition. The stakeholders were consulted, but decisions were taken in this 
select group. 
Given the technical complexity of the project, the municipalities Neerpelt and Overpelt 
decided to use a ’concessie van openbare werken’ (‘concession of public works’) for public 
tendering. This legal instrument was chosen because of the possibility it presented to 
formulate clear requirements concerning the desired output and cooperation. The use of 
this instrument would also have an effect on the utilization of control mechanisms in the 
public-private stage of the PPP (in relation with the private partner). The result in this 
phase is a detailed blueprint, being a product of the network negotiations between the 
two municipalities on the one side and between the stakeholders and the Service 
Association Pelt on the other side. The detailed output specifications would effect the 
public-private stage, as it restricted the freedom of the private candidates in their 
proposals (see below). 
 
Elshout 
Similar to Dommelslag, Elshout faced a workable level of multi-actor complexity. It was 
relatively easy to bring all relevant actors together. In the first steps in the public-public 
stage of Elshout, network-like instruments were used mainly. Because of the weak link 
between both municipalities (compared to Dommelslag), the agreements however had to 
be contractualized in an ‘afsprakennota’ (‘agreement note’), intended to curb the 
relational risks (illustrating more market-like control behavior). The negotiations preceding 
the agreement were therefore harder and characterized by more distrust in comparison 
with Dommelslag. 
The difference in culture of the swimming clubs and the involvement of quite a few actors 
would have demanded a prolonged public-public structuring phase to align positions. The 
public actors however were weary to increase relational risks by giving such negotiations 
too much attention. The public actors also wanted to save time, and therefore opted for a 
different legal procedure then Dommelslag. By using a ’domeinconcessie’ (‘domain 
concession’) the municipalities did not/could not make use of extended specifications on 
behorehand, hence avoiding an intense deliberation round to draw up such specification 
(as was the case in Dommelslag). Moreover, a key political person of Brasschaat had close 
relations with the Port Company Antwerp (‘Antwerpse Havenbedrijf’), which provided 
access to technical expertise on how to use domain concessions.   
Brasschaat was owner of the grounds and Schoten was not prepared to purchase a share in 
it. For that reason, there was no need to establish a separate legal person. Hence, 
Brasschaat and Schoten opted for the most simple form of intermunicipal cooperation, 
being the Interlocal Association. This association would advise Brasschaat (being sole 
owner and concession giver) about the choice of a suitable private candidate. Schoten, 
however, wanted guarantees as a compensation for the implantation of the swimming pool 
in Brasschaat. This resulted in the agreement note mentioned above. In Schoten, the 
decision of establishing the interlocal association was taken by an ad hoc majority in the 
municipal council (so one party of the governing coalition opposed, and the other party got 
votes from a party in the opposition). Within this formalized setting, there was improved 
ground for more network-like control. 
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The price tag of the project was an important factor for the municipalities (especially for 
Brasschaat). Therefore, it was essential for the municipalities that the project could profit 
from an advantageous VAT-regime. The best guarantee to make sure that the 
advantageous VAT-regime could be applied on the project, was the use of the 
’domeinconsessie’. 
The political complexity had a great effect on the institutional design and the control 
mechanisms. Because of the societal, party political and intergovernmental salience, the 
municipality councils were closely involved in the process and much attention was paid to 
get their ex ante authorisation (i.e. a hierarchic control-instrument). This way, all political 
parties were engaged in the project, meaning they had less grounds to resist the project 
after being consulted or even having approved decisions. The pressure to act rapidly was 
an extra motivation to make use of the domain concession. 
At this stage, the most important task was composing the conditions for the 
’domeinconcessie’. The latter occurred in mutual consultation in the body of the Interlocal 
Association. Due to the restrictions of this legal instrument, the outcome was a rather 
vague blueprint for the project – the grounds had to be used to construct and operate a 
pool infrastructure. This had its consequences for the next stage since the private 
candidates were almost entirely free in designing their proposal. In this way, the public 
actors were more dependent on the quality of the incoming tenders. 
 
2.1.3. Interim conclusion  
In both Dommelslag and Elshout, a number of components of our complexity concept have 
pressed a clear stamp on the course of the process of the PPP. In the case of Dommelslag 
the nature and size of the project, the relevant actors and the small political salience 
during the public-public stage have resulted in a technocratic structuring by a select group 
of relevant actors who interact on a network-like basis. A further formalization took place 
by establishing a service association with the same group of actors sitting in the Board of 
Directors. Like we expected, the structuring of the two independent municipalities was 
formally dominated by network instruments.  
Particularly for the case of Elshout, the political salience surrounding the project resulted 
in the focus for creating (party political) policy support for the project. This had an effect 
on the structuring of the two municipalities in a way that every political party was 
represented in the Interlocal Association. Similar to Dommelslag, the structuring of the 
two independent municipalities was dominated by the network mechanism. However, 
because of the weak ties between the two municipalities and low mutual trust, the 
agreements between the two were contractualized (so complemented by the market-
oriented mechanism). Because the future swimming pool would be constructed on 
Brasschaat territory, Schoten demanded some compensations (60-40 division of the costs, 
better connections and public transportation from Schoten to the swimming pool,…).  
Finally, the choice of using the ’domeinconcessie’ in Elshout was influenced by the 
political salience, the possibility to get an advantageous VAT-regime and the access to the 
expertise through the connections with the Port Company. The use of this 
’domeinconcessie’ would have a severe impact on the use of control mechanisms because 
it implied restricted ex ante use of control mechanisms. The option for a concession of 
public works in Dommelslag on the other hand allowed the public partners to control in a 
very detailed manner what the private partner would have to propose as a project.  
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We will now focus on complexity and control in the public-private stage, shifting the focus 
of the intergovernmental relations to the public-private interactions. 
 
2.2. Public-private stage  
The public-private stage clusters the third and fourth stage defined in section 1.3. In this 
stage, we shift our focus to control relations between public and private actors. 
 
2.2.1. Complexity 
The conclusion of the public-public stage marks the beginning of the public-private stage, 
where the PPP-project continues in a new configuration. The public parties are now united 
in their intercommunal bodies (whether or not with an own legal personality) and the 
private partners enter the arena. This new constellation brings up new aspects of 
complexity. Table 3 gives an overview of the new issues of complexity that appear in this 
stage (so it does not repeat the elements in table 2 of the public-public stage). 
The major differences between the complexity in the two cases, besides the diverse public 
structuring, are the characteristics of the private partners. In Dommelslag, a loose 
consortium of private companies with limited experience was selected, increasing of the 
operational and relational risks. In Elshout, on the other hand, the selected consortium 
was more robust, experienced, and had a sturdy financial profile. However, one of the 
private partners had a fundamentally different idea (and culture) about the exploitation of 
pool infrastructures. This also affected the relational and operational risks in a negative 
way. Finally, the political complexity in both cases disappeared somewhat to the 
background. 
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Table 3: Complexity in the Public-private stage 
 Dommelslag Elshout 
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In this stage the two neighboring municipalities (Overpelt and Neerpelt) had 
organized themselves in the Intermunicipal Association Pelt. With the Decree of 
Intermunicipal Cooperation (2001), they had to reform the intermunicipal 
cooperation into the Service Association Pelt. Since this decree, the municipals 
where obliged to take members of the opposition (with advisory vote) into the 
Board of Directors. 
 
¾ Board of Directors (small and close group) 
¾ General Assembly (mayor of Neerpelt and ex-mayor of Overpelt) 
¾ Body with legal personality 
 
Three private candidates signed in for the tendering procedure 
The selected candidate was S&R Pelt: 
¾ consortium of several companies (constructors, architect, maintenance 
firm, exploitation firm 
¾ loose connection between the different firms 
¾ Their first project 
¾ Constructors wanted to leave the after the delivery of the swimming pool 
¾ Maintenance firm wanted to cooperate with a rival consortium 
 
Stakeholders 
¾ schools, swimming clubs, diving club, inhabitants of the municipalities 
In this stage the two neighboring municipalities (Brasschaat and Schoten) had organized 
themselves in the Interlocal Association Brasschaat-Schoten  
This association was set up after the Decree of Intermunicipal Cooperation (2001), so 
followed similar rules as Dommelslag.  
 
 
¾ body without legal personality 
¾ exists out of the two municipal councils 
¾ Board exists out of representatives from every political party 
¾ Gives binding advice to Brasschaat 
 
Three private candidates signed in for the tendering procedure 
The selected candidate was Sportavan: 
¾ consortium of three big companies (constructor, maintenance and exploitation) 
¾ experienced 
¾ The exploitation firm has a different opinion than the other partners 
 Forced out of the consortium 
 Sportavan becomes Sportoase (two partners take the exploitation-
responsibility 
 
Stakeholders 
¾ schools, swimming clubs (Brasschaat: swimming schools; Schoten: competition 
clubs), diving club, inhabitants of the municipalities 
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A pool-infrastructure with three basins, recreational elements, wellness-facilities 
and cafeteria 
Total investment of € 7,5 million financed by the private partner 
Yearly endowment of € 1 million to the private partner 
¾ 50 % Overpelt 
¾ 50 % Neerpelt 
 
Operational risks 
¾ demand risk 
¾ Failure private partner 
A pool infrastructure with three basins, recreational elements, wellness-facilities, 
fitness-facilities and multifunctional cafeteria 
Total investment of € 14,3 million financed by the private partner  
Yearly endowment of € 1,25 million to the private partner 
¾ 60% Brasschaat 
¾ 40 % Schoten 
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 Societal salience 
¾ entrance fee for the recreational user too high 
Societal salience 
¾ Entrance fee for the recreational user too high 
 
Democratic risk 
¾ Free-rider problem (neighboring municipalities) 
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2.2.2. Control  
The starting point of the public-private stage were the specifications (‘lastenboek’)and the 
tender procedures drawn up by the public partners in the previous stage. In both cases this 
document was the basis on which the tendering and the future cooperation between the 
public and private partners would take shape. Like we stated before, in Dommelslag the 
use of the ‘concessie van openbare werken’ made it possible to define many and detailed 
unilateral provisions. In Elshout, by using the ‘domeinconcessie’, much more additional 
negotiations were needed once the partner was selected. 
 
 
Dommelslag 
In Dommelslag, contacts between the public partners and the private partners channeled 
through the Service Association Pelt. The specifications that had been established by the 
Service Association were an important source of control. A number of obligations with 
respect to the construction and the exploitation of the future swimming pool had been 
registered in it.  By using a ’concessie van openbare werken’, the municipalities were able 
to fully develop competition between the private candidates. Further negotiations were 
conducted with the preferred bidder. To do so, a steering group was established (with the 
leading figures of both public and private partners), as a relatively network-like 
instrument. The results of this negotiation were written down in the concession agreement 
(being a typical market instrument).  
The steering group continued to exist after the new swimming pool opened its doors. This 
group acts as an informal discussion platform between the representatives of the Service 
Association Pelt and the representatives of the private consortium. The contract stipulated 
that, after the construction phase, the public and the private partner would have contact 
moments twice a year, but in practice, this frequency was much higher, up to one meeting 
each month. A possible reason can be found in the dominant network-like controlling 
culture of the public actors. An other possible reason is that the unstable and 
inexperienced position of the private partners at the beginning of this stage required a 
narrow involvement of the public partners. 
The departure of the private constructors and the directors of the exploitation firm during 
the public-private stage resulted in a private consortium with a small financial basis. In 
addition, distrust appeared when one of the private partners wanted to cooperate with a 
rival consortium. Network-like control mechanisms alone seemed no longer sufficient to 
get things straightened out. The public partner had to make use of the legal weapon of 
putting the private consortium into default(‘ingebreke stelling’), so using market control 
instruments present in the contract. These problems were however fixed a few months 
later, and trust was gradually restored.  
The political complexity shifted from the actual issue of building a swimming pool, to the 
quality-level of the swimming pool and the price level of the entrance fee. A year after the 
opening of the new  swimming pool, the private partner unilateral raised the entrance fee 
for the recreational swimmer, which was allowed by the contract. Remarkable in this 
context was the reaction of the public actor. It was not the increase of the prices what 
created resistance on behalf of the public partner, but the fact this occurred without prior 
consultation (as we stated this was not required according to the contract). As a result, 
the public party suspended the steering group meetings for some months. The public party 
used this pressure instrument to obtain a registration of a consultation procedure for 
raising the prices into the contract. So even when the general control mechanism is 
network-like, other control mechanisms are present as well.   
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Elshout 
In Elshout, because the (societal) stakeholders (end-users) were not (or minimally) 
involved in the public-public stage, they now became involved during the appraisal of the 
private candidates. In this way, the municipalities could counter criticism that 
stakeholders were not sufficiently heard. To do so, stakeholders, civil servants and 
politicians of both municipalities were divided into groups in order of themes 
(architecture, finances, exploitation, sport facilities).  
As a result of using the ‘domeinconcessie’, the municipalities in the case of Elshout were 
more limited in their ex ante control instruments. Thus, the municipalities could not 
impose concrete provisions on the construction and exploitation of the future swimming 
pool. Consequently, the municipalities were dependent on the quality of the incoming 
tenders. 
After the selection of the private candidate and the approval of the ‘domeinconsessie’, the 
public parties had to negotiate an additional ‘exploitation agreement’. The application of 
a double contract structure was needed because of the restrictions of the 
‘domeinconcessie’; so control was strengthened by adding additional agreements.  
During the negotiations for this exploitation agreement, it became clear that the 
exploitation company of the private consortium had a different view on running a 
swimming pool than the public partners. In addition, the exploitation company was not 
very keen to bear any operational risks. This created a great distrust between the public 
party and the exploitation company. The public partner used a market-oriented control 
mechanism by playing its roll as sponsor to force the exploitation company out of the 
consortium: “The deal would go on without the exploitation company or the deal would 
be off” (politician). 
Still during the construction of the pool infrastructure, a neighboring municipality decided 
to give its inhabitants a discount when they went swimming in the swimming pools of 
Brasschaat and Schoten. This arrangement made it possible for those people to swim at a 
lower price than the inhabitants of Brasschaat and Schoten. Taking into account the 
societal salience surrounding the swimming pool, this would have a severe effect on the 
perception of the own inhabitants on the swimming pool. Brasschaat and Schoten used 
network-like control to get the private partner to implement a more advantageous tariff 
for the own inhabitants (i.e. illustrating collaboration-oriented behavior). 
During the construction and after the opening of the pool infrastructure, the two 
municipalities in the body of the Interlocal Association took more distance of the project 
and withdraw to a purely supervision function. The public partners left the realisation of 
the project in large degree in the hands of the private partner. While the different 
contracts create a wide set of control and monitoring instruments (see table 4 belwo), the 
Interlocal Association barely used them so far. 
Giving the private partner much autonomy to maintain and operate the pool 
infrastructure, but preserving the possibility for supervision and having ultimate decision 
power provided the public partners with the feeling of trust in the cooperation and in the 
automatic progress of the project. 
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2.2.3. Interim conclusions 
The decision in the public-public stage of using the ‘domeinconcessie’ in the case of 
ELshout and the ‘concessie van openbare werken’ in the case of Dommelslag had 
consequences for the public-private stage. In Dommelslag, the public actors could 
formulate some obligations concerning the exploitation of the pool infrastructure. This 
gave the public actor in Dommelslag the opportunity to create competition between the 
private candidates to come up with the best solutions, and sharp prices. The public party 
also used market-oriented control instruments frequently (competition, output-oriented 
specifications, severe negotiations,..). The use of the ‘domeinconcessie’ in Elshout on the 
other hand restricted the use of ex ante control mechanisms. To compensate this, the 
public party had to negotiate a separate exploitation agreement. During this negotiations 
the public party applied network- and market-like control mechanisms to come to a 
desired product.  
In Dommelslag, the outcome of the selection phase resulted in the selection of a loose 
private consortium without much experience with this kind of project. Shortly after the 
construction of the pool infrastructure, the consortium fell apart. As a result of the 
relatively unstable and (after the departure of some private actors) rather small 
consortium, the public partner closely monitored and controlled the project. The steering 
group became the core of the cooperation. In this group, the public and private actors 
interacted on a network-like basis, except for some periods of crisis. The contracts were 
rarely used to exercise control, again except in moments of crisis. As the project 
progressed, cooperation would support more and more on mutual consultation. The 
contract disappeared to the background, but created the conditions where network 
mechanisms could develop. In interviews, the public actors compared the contract with 
the private partner with a ‘marriage contract’: one hopes one never has to make use of it. 
In the case of Elshout the exploitation company was forced out of the consortium. The two 
remaining private partners however gained a lot of trust from the public partners. This 
trust was mutual; one the one hand the public party trusted in the competence of the 
private partner and on the other hand the private party trusted in the goodwill of the 
public partner. This trust diminished the perceived relational and operational risk, which 
effected the use of control instruments and mechanisms. 
 
Table 4: Control elements in the contracts 
 
 Dommelslag Sportoase Elshout 
Information and consultation +++ + 
Supervision ++ +++ 
Tarrif setting ++ ++ 
Financial guarantees (besides insurance)* ++ + 
Provisions in the exploitation phase + ++ 
Provisions in the construction phase ++ +++ 
Maintanance + ++ 
Dispute regulation ++ ++ 
Qualitative service and optimal management + + 
Target groups ++ + 
Interpretation swimming pool** +++ + 
*Obligatorily fill of social capital (above the legal amount) 
**Mark that also at Elshout a detailed interpretation of the swimming pool was given up. This interpretation 
was however entirely done by the private partner and concerns the selected project proposal 
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As we stated above, the use of different legal instruments in the two cases had  
complications for the opportunity of ex ante control. Nevertheless, table 4 indicates that, 
in the end, no major differences appear between Dommelslag and Elshout in terms of 
content of the contracts. The major difference is the degree of interpretation of the 
swimming pool concept. Another important difference found relates to the area of 
information and consultation structures (more focused on in Dommelslag, if compared to 
Elshout). This might be explained by the different controlling cultures within the 
municipalities which also impregnated in the PPP. 
 
  
Table 5: Focus on control mechanisms in the contracts 
 Dommelslag Sportoase Elshout 
co
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- Obligation to supply all information and 
facilities hence the leading civil servant is able 
to exercise his task 
- Steergroup (1 x per month) 
- Attending yard meetings 
- The concession holder sends a report to the 
inter-local association quarterly 
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 - Steer group (formal 2x per year, factual twice a 
month) 
- During conflict aim at a friendly arrangement 
- Annual report concerning the exploitation of the 
complex 
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- Leading civil servant 
- Number of decisions reserved to the Service 
Association Pelt 
- Control of the accountancy 
- The concession holder provides at all time 
access to the yard and access to all documents 
and pieces relevant for the yard as well as 
accountancy.  
- The right letting the accountancy check by 
external auditors 
- After the construction the concession holder 
delivers a post-intervention dossier (as built) 
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- Control of the accountancy 
 
- The concession holder is obliged to provide 
access to the accomodation and insight in all 
documents and pieces relevant for the 
exploitation of the project 
- Control on the accountancy 
- The right letting the accountancy check by 
external auditors 
D
is
pu
te
-
re
gu
la
ti
on
 - Friendly arrangement as first option: two 
adjudicators by respectively the one and other 
party. Possibly addition of a third independent 
adjudicator  
- Court 
- Reconciliation court as first option: two 
members by respectively the one and other 
party. 
- Court 
 
Table 5 summarizes the focus on control in the contracts. It clearly shows that in the case 
of Dommelslag, in formal terms, a larger emphasis is put on consultation and information 
supply than in the case of Elshout. With the latter, the accent lies on supervision and 
control. In the case of Elshout, this supervision and control is not applied so strictly (e.g. 
external monitoring of accountancy) as the agreements might indicate, because public 
actors trust the capacity and expertise of the private partner. In the case of Dommelslag, 
the actual consultation and information supply on the other hand are still stronger than 
formulated in the agreements. 
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2.3. Linking the public-public stage to the public-private stage  
In this section, we link the main control insights of each stage. As table 6 shows, in the 
public-public stage of the PPP, we mainly find network control. This can be explained by 
the interdependency of the municipalities, who are seeking alignment in both cases. The 
relatively small differences between the two cases can be explained by the difference in 
informal use of the formal network-like setting. Also, the different structuring of the 
cooperation between two municipalities effects the used control instruments and 
mechanisms. The use of a service association in Dommelslag for instance allowed more 
mechanisms of hierarchic control (e.g. Board of Directors) than the inter-local association 
in Elshout. 
 
Table 6: Control across the phases 
Dommelslag Sportoase Elshout  
H M N H M N 
Initiation   +++  + ++ Pub-
pub Public-structuring ++  +++ +  +++ 
Selection ++(+) ++ + + +++ (+) 
   (negotiation in particular) + +++ +(+) + +++ + Pub-priv 
Execution +(+) ++ +++ + +++ +(+) 
*+: low use, ++: moderate use, +++: high use 
In the selection phase (first part of the public-private stage), we find more difference in 
control between both cases. In Elshout, more emphasis is put on market-like control. A 
possible explanation is the use of the ‘domeinconcessie’, which restricts municipalities in 
their ex ante control. This made them more dependent on what the market offered them 
in the field of pool facilities. In Dommelslag, by using a ‘concessie van openbare werken’, 
the municipalities could formulate more ex ante requirements. For that reason, they had 
more seizure over the private candidates. 
In the actual negotiations (i.e. part of the selection phase), in both cases, the emphasis 
lies on market-like control. The preferred bidder is selected and the public and private 
partners become more or less equal partners at the negotiation table. The end of this 
phase is the contract. 
In the execution phase (second part of the public-private stage), the private actors and the 
public actors become full partners. In this phase, the control mechanisms used by the 
public partner are both network- and market-like. In Dommelslag, the accent lies 
especially on network control. A first possible explanation might be the dominant control 
culture within the municipalities. A second possible explanation might be the unstable 
situation in Dommelslag, in terms of the make-up of the private consortium, required a 
close involvement of the public partners at the beginning of this stage. In Elshout, the 
emphasis lies mainly on market-oriented control. The most logic reason for this, is that the 
public partners considered their task that of being a more general one, namely ensuring 
that a pool infrastructure was present (as opposed to Dommelslag, where public partners 
were also much more interested in the actual substance of that infrastructure). In Elshout, 
the public parties stick to their supervisory role, and the private actor is regarded as the 
one who knows best how to develop and operate a pool complex. The negotiated contract 
and the risk-sharing remain the most important (underlying) control instrument. 
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Interestingly, although the performance dimension is not part of this paper, it is relevant 
to point out that the difference in complexity and control between both cases does not 
seem to generate much difference in the performance of the PPPs. Firstly, the resulting 
infrastructure is relatively similar. Secondly, in both cases, local governments, users, and 
private partners are satisfied. Among other things, this results in high visitor numbers (in 
comparison with the past and in comparison with the initial expectations). Although the 
initial cost of the Elshout complex is almost double the initial cost in Dommelslag, there 
are no large differences in the annual contributions from the municipalities to the private 
partner. An important factor that plays here is the larger range of users in Elshout (which 
results in more recreational swimmers and advantage of scale). Moreover, the additional 
fitness activities in Elshout ensure an extra income source to the private partner, limiting 
the exploitation shortages. This however might also be the result of the fact that, in the 
case of Elshout, the private partner had much more freedom to fill in the pool 
infrastructure to his own vision. The relation between control and performance therefore 
needs additional analysis, but falls out of the scope of this paper. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
In the introduction, we posed two questions: how do public partners control different 
stages of a PPP, and how is control affected by elements of complexity? We will point to 
the main elements and lessons relevant for discussion, using the most illustrative examples 
of the case studies.  
 
Complexity vs. control 
We find that the control mix is indeed affected by elements of complexity. The first set of 
case studies share a number of features of complexity (e.g. most elements of technical 
complexity), which lead to the presence and use of a number of similar control 
instruments. However, it is also clear that a number of differences in complexity help to 
explain differences in the control mix.  
In the public-public stage, for instance, the control relations between different partners 
differs in the two cases. In Dommelslag, Neerpelt and Overpelt already featured close and 
friendly contacts between the leading officials in both (similar) governing coalitions before 
the PPP. This pre-existing ‘network’ clearly facilitated the interactions during the public-
public stage, making the process of drawing up a joint project a relatively network-like 
process, based on trust and reciprocity. In Elshout, this positive history between the two 
governments was not present before the PPP. They were more distrusting (in comparison 
with the case of Dommelslag), and negotiated hard with one another, making it a more 
market-like setting because exchange was the main interaction pattern. This is illustrated 
by the way Schoten negotiated with Brasschaat - which wanted to get the pool 
infrastructure on a plot of land they owned on its own territory - and got compensations 
for agreeing to the location. 
Another illustration of how the difference in complexity affects control is the ownership 
structure of the public resources. In Dommelslag, both governments set up a joint 
organisational structure as a legal person, with a joint ownership of the plot of land where 
the pool infrastructure is built (even if it is fully located on the territory of Overpelt). In 
Elshout, Brasschaat owns the plot of land and has little interest in sharing it with Schoten 
and vice versa, and the joint project structure of both governments is no legal person but 
merely a coordination platform that meets a couple of times a year. As a result, the 
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Dommelslag case involves a much more shared and network-like ownership and interaction 
on equal footing, with frequent meetings. In Elshout, Brasschaat behaved more 
dominantly, and Schoten responded with demands of its own, trying to get a good deal. 
Gradually, after a common agreement was put down, Brasschaat and Schoten evolved to 
an equal partnership, and more network-like instruments and mechanisms came in place.   
In the public-private stage, we also find illustrations how complexity affects control. In 
Dommelslag, the public partners of course use market instruments to select and contract a 
private consortium. However, they continue in a network-like fashion, involving many and 
close contacts with the private consortium, emphasising good personal relations and trust, 
also meeting frequently. The public actors clearly want to have a high degree of control 
over the substance of the PPP. Consequently, they opt for a legal procedure which allows 
them to do so. In contrast, the Elshout case shows how public actors take a more distant 
position, letting the private partners decide about substance – as long as a pool 
infrastructure would be built. Hence, in Elshout, the public-private interactions are much 
more business-like, much more formal, and limited to a couple of meetings a year.  
Another example is the way the political complexity leads to the use of different control 
instruments. The high political complexity in the Elshout case leads to a much attention 
for stakeholders, political parties, etc. while the low political complexity in the 
Dommelslag case involves a relatively closed, network-like control relation with the 
governing elite.  
 
Different uses of control instruments  
Another conclusion is that the threefold control instrument typology is useful, but should 
be developed further. Although we related the individual control instruments to one 
control mechanism, it becomes clear that individual control instruments can be used in 
different control mechanisms. As such, if one focuses on their actual use, they make up 
more a continuum (e.g. more market-, more hierarchy-, or more network-like) than 
absolute categories. Contracts for instance can be framed in a market-like fashion (e.g. 
can be enforced in court, are very detailed, are frequently monitored, have a range of 
sanctions, etc), but also in a network-like spirit (e.g. are only gentlemen’s agreements, 
are relatively simple and not highly detailed, have a joint monitoring, weak or no 
sanctions, etc.). Similarly, incentives can be market-based (harsh financial sanctions and 
rewards, court interventions) or network-based (like exclusion of negotiations, loose of 
trust and reputation). An example of this can be found in the contracts of our two cases. In 
Dommelslag, the contract emphasised instruments of information and consult, while in 
Elshout the contract mainly contains instruments of monitoring and control. 
 
Formal content of control vs. actual behaviour of partners 
The case studies show that there is a difference between the formal content and presence 
of control instruments on the one hand, and the actual behaviour partners develop. There 
is a distinction between formal control versus informal behaviour. 
A clear example is the way in which the governments in the Dommelslag case exercise 
control. In the public-private stage, the private consortium suddenly raises prices, which 
they are allowed to do so by the contract. The public actors however are upset, and 
expected that the private partner, in the network-like atmosphere of trust and mutual 
consultation, would have discussed this with them on beforehand. They even act by 
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freezing the relations with the private partner for a period of time. So while the private 
partner behaves and acts within the control instruments used, the public actors have 
different expectations about that use and respond with actions outside the formal control 
instruments.   
Another illustration is the agreement note (‘afsprakennota’) between partners in Elshout 
that sums up ten points to conclude the public-public stage. In formal terms, it is a typical 
agreement between network partners, but the actual behaviour to reach that agreement 
shows a much more market-like relation, with hard bargaining, distrust and exchange, 
instead of trust and reciprocity.  
These findings spark our interested in the actual control that takes shape in interactions 
between actors in the PPP. So on the one hand, we use a typology of formal control 
instruments, that might fit (closer to) one of the three control mechanisms. On the other 
hand – and this is where PPP-research should be developed further – is the level of the 
actual interactions between actors. The formal instruments are relevant as they provide 
grounds for control, but their presence or absence says little about their actual use or 
relevance in concrete practices. One PPP might involve a wide set of control instruments 
but without being used in the interaction between actors, and vice versa. It is the 
combination of the formal and informal picture that we aspire to develop further to enrich 
the PPP-research. 
 
Control cycles through stages 
Another conclusion is that the stage-approach is valuable to understand control in the PPP, 
as control instruments, mechanisms and practices in one stage for instance present 
institutional constraints in the following stage.  
From the analysis of the public-public stage, we learn that even while the public actors are 
positioned horizontally (two local governments in each case), the actual interaction is 
different. While the history of close and good contacts between local government officials 
in the Dommelslag case lead to a very network like interaction, the relations between local 
governments in the Elshout case is much more market like. This context leads to a 
different structuration between public partners, with different control instruments. In 
Dommelslag, for instance, control is developed more technocratic. In Elshout, on the 
contrary, the structuration is very market-like, and includes the search of a broad societal 
and political support for the project.  
It is also shown that the different outcome of the public-public stages in both cases leads 
to a different interaction process in the public-private stage. The way the specifications 
are drawn up as the end product of the public-public stage, and the choice for a certain 
type of legal procedure to enter the public-private stage, clearly affects the dynamics of 
negotiation in the public-private stage. The option in Dommelslag to use ‘concessie voor 
openbare werken’ enables them to exercise detailed control on the substance of the PPP, 
while the option in Elshout to use ‘domeinconcessie’ leaves them with little control during 
the selection stage, expect the need to construct a pool infrastructure on that plot of 
land. As a result, the contracts and negotiations in Dommelslag are very intense in the 
beginning of the public-private stage, while the contracts and negotiations in Elshout are 
less intense, and need to be complemented later in the public-private stage by a number 
of other documents to achieve the desired results. 
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We conclude that while the conceptual framework needs to be developed further in a 
number of directions discussed above, it proves a valuable basis to work on. We need to 
make a more systematic distinction between formal control instruments and mechanisms 
and informal control practices. We also need to continue to develop the control-language - 
however useful, for instance to map potential control instruments systematically - which 
needs to be linked with the actual use in the interactions between partners.  
Finally, it is clear that we are not able to unlock the full potential of (these components 
of) the conceptual framework in the first set of case studies discussed in this paper. We 
except that the relevance of the components will become more clear when we have 
analysed the next sets of case studies, as they bring in more differences in terms of 
complexity features. We are only at the beginning of an interesting journey in the world of 
PPPs.  
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